Rodger et al have interestingly argued that xenotransplantation should, if possible, entail the use of genetic pain disenhancement to prevent otherwise unavoidable pain in ‘donor’ animals.1 Their argument relies on the empirical assumption that xenotransplantation offers a realistic solution to organ shortage, and that, due to the recent clinical developments and the lack of human donors, it will thus continue for the foreseeable future. We argue below that other options should be prioritised over xenotransplantation, and that so-called ‘non-sentientist’ harms are undervalued in discussions on disenhancement.

We do not challenge the empirical claim made by the authors. That is, xenotransplantation research might continue for the foreseeable future since organ demand is increasing. However, we disagree with the priority given to xenotransplantation over other solutions that are more morally desirable. We argue that, if we comply with the 3R principles (Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement of the use of animals in research) and follow a minimal welfarist reasoning (to which the authors seem to adhere), then (1) the principle of replacement demands the use of non-animal alternatives if possible and (2) there are alternative solutions that lead to morally better consequences.

Schematically, there are …